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ABSTRACT 
As cheating is an inherent threat to voting, it is essential that an e-voting system provides a 
high level of security. At the moment, commercially available e-voting solutions mainly 
advertise their convenience, efficiency and low cost. On the other hand, cryptographically 
secure voting schemes in the literature are generally considered to be complex and inefficient 
for a real-world implementation. This paper examines implementation issues of 
cryptographically secure secret-ballot voting schemes. A survey of different schemes and 
various implementations is provided. The possibilities of hardware implementations for 
various cryptographic primitives are discussed. The paper provides a foundation in designing 
secure and practical e-voting schemes to produce a secure, efficient and publicly acceptable 
implementation of voting schemes in the real world. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Voting is fundamental to any consensus-based society. It is a basic tool to reveal a group's 
opinion on a matter that is under consideration. National election is the most important 
application of voting in democratic societies. This is because the result concerns the 
governing of a nation, and affects the lives of its citizens. Other example applications of 
voting range from passing legislations in parliament, and decision making in shareholder 
meetings to student council elections, and reality television shows.  
As the size of population and the need to cover larger constituencies increases, paper-based 
(traditional / manual / conventional) voting becomes cumbersome for large-scale voting. 
Other factors such as accuracy, efficiency (tally speed), and convenience make the transition 
to electronic voting inevitable.   
1.1.  Electronic Voting 
Starting with the use of mechanical machines in voting (lever voting machines) as 
documented by Jones (2001), automation of voting using electronically supported devices has 
gained significant popularity. Voter turnout and the problems encountered during the 2000 
US presidential election case in Florida have also positively influenced the acceptability of 
electronic voting (e-voting). Recent use in popular reality television shows (world idol, big 
brother, video hits) made e-voting a natural part of our everyday lives. 
 There are a number of different approaches to realise e-voting to date. Machine readable 
(create, read, count) ballot systems, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems (using touch 
screen machines), voting using mobile/handheld devices, and Internet voting systems are all 
categorised as e-voting. It is important to understand that e-voting generically refers to 
“voting using some electronic means”.  
Compared to manual / paper-based voting, e-voting has the following fundamental 
advantages: 

 Convenience 
E-voting is more convenient for voters. For national election, more polling 
booths can be set-up using remote connection for ballot collection. This 
reduces voters' travel time, and significantly increases voter turnout. For voting 
with a lower security requirement (e.g. reality television shows), using the 
Internet or mobile devices is the most convenient methods for voters to vote. 
Voters are allowed to vote from any location at their convenience. Voting from 
abroad is also possible. 

 Efficiency 
Using some electronic means (e.g. optical mark sense sheets, touch screen 
voting, remote connection), tally stage to reveal voting result is made more 
efficient. Ballots tabulation and the aggregation of results from different 
polling locations can be done electronically. Using e-voting, voting result can 
be revealed in a timelier manner compared to manual counting of paper 
ballots. 

 Accuracy 
A high profile case of manual counting inaccuracy was disclosed during the 
2000 US presidential election in Florida, where a manual recount was 
performed. Using e-voting, human error can be eliminated in the tally stage. 
Ballot validity is automatically checked, and the counting is performed by 
software. Using certified software, the voting result obtained is more accurate 
compared to manual counting. 

 Cost 
The use of electronic ballot removes the cost of producing a physical paper 
ballot. The use of some remote communication mechanisms also minimises the 
cost of transporting physical ballots for aggregation of voting result. Ballot 
counting automation using a computer program minimises administration 
overhead, and reduces the number of officials required for the counting 
process.  

 Additional features 
Compared to the manual system, there are additional features that only an e-
voting system can offer. These features include vote revocation, vote 
correction, and individual vote verification. Depending on the voting 
application, these functionalities might be desirable to have. 
 
Aside from the above, an essential property required in a voting system is security. 
Whether it is fame, political power, financial gains or others, there is considerable motive for 
cheating in voting. Further discussion on security is provided in Section 2. The challenge in e-
voting research is to design a system providing more functionality and security than the 
current manual / traditional one. 
 1.2.  Main Contributions 
This paper presents implementation issues in secure e-voting schemes. Security threats in a 
voting system are identified and discussed as a motivation to have a secure e-voting system. 
To have a secure system, security must be incorporated within the system. Three important 
phases (Figure 1) of having a secure system are identified as: design, development, and 
deployment. These phases are examined and analysed in this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Framework to Create Secure E-Voting Systems 
 
A review of cryptographic voting schemes is provided as a fundamental design to build a 
secure voting system. Problems in the development phase and their possible solutions are 
identified. Further issues in the deployment phase and their possible solutions are also 
identified. The paper provides a foundation for creating a secure, efficient, and publicly 
acceptable e-voting system to be used in the real world. 
1.3.  Organisation of the Paper 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers background knowledge, 
security threats and security requirements of a voting system. Section 3 reviews two 
fundamental schemes in e-voting cryptographic protocol designs. Section 4 and 5 present 
issues and possible solutions in the development and deployment phase of a voting system 
respectively. Section 6 is a conclusion. 
2.  VOTING AND SECURITY 
2.1.  Overview 
A voting scenario typically consists of four stages. They are: 
1. Set-up stage 
During this stage, voting parameters are initialised. They include candidates, voters 
and authorities’ eligibility criteria, voting procedures, ballot validity rules, and 
counting rules. Eligible candidates register themselves, and the registration and tally 
authorities are selected in this stage. Afterward, the voting parameters, candidates and 
authorities are made public such that they can be publicly known and verified. 
2. Registration stage 
Voters are allowed to register themselves to the registration authorities during this 
stage. Their eligibility is determined by the criteria set in the previous stage, where 
ineligible voters are not allowed to register and participate in voting. Afterward, the 
list of registered voters is published for public verification. 
Design phase 
cryptographic voting protocols 
Deployment phase 
policy, procedures, auditing, … 
Development phase 
standard, evaluation criteria, … 
 3. Voting stage 
During the voting period, registered voters are then allowed to cast their votes as 
follows: 
a. Voter authentication: each voter is authenticated according to the list of 
registered voters in the previous stage, and those who are not found in the list 
are not allowed to participate in this stage. 
b. Vote registration: each of the authenticated voters then receives an empty 
ballot, and registers his/her vote in the ballot inside a physically private and 
secure location to avoid coercion/intimidation. 
c. Ballot casting: the ballot is then anonymised such that the “voter-vote” 
relationship is kept secret; in paper-based voting, this is achieved by using a 
sealed ballot-box where ballots are anonymised inside the ballot-box. 
4. Tally stage 
In this final stage, all ballots from the previous stage are processed to obtain the voting 
result as follows: 
a. Ballot collection: the ballots from the voting stage are collected; in paper-
based voting, ballots are obtained after the sealed ballot-boxes are opened by 
tally authorities. 
b. Ballot verification: each of the ballots is verified to be valid or invalid 
according to the rules set during the set-up stage, where invalid ballots are not 
included for tabulation. 
c. Vote tabulation: valid ballots are counted and tabulated as per the counting 
rules; the results from each polling location are aggregated, and the voting 
result is revealed and made public. 
2.2.  Voting Systems 
In terms of elections, there are various voting systems used by different countries. Each of 
them has its own advantages and disadvantages. Some might be considered to be fairer than 
others. The Handbook of Electoral System Design by Reynolds and Reilly (1997) lists the 
categorisation of these systems as below. 

 Plurality-majority systems 
In plurality-based systems, the candidate with the highest number of votes 
wins (no threshold of votes). In majority-based systems, the candidate with a 
majority of votes wins (above a certain threshold).  

 Proportional representation systems 
Voting results under this system are proportional to the number of votes 
received. For example, if a major party wins 40% of the votes in an election, 
the party will be allocated approximately 40% of the seats, and a minor party 
with 10% of the votes will also gain 10% of the parliamentary seats. This is to 
reduce the disparity between a party's share of the national vote and its share of 
the parliamentary seats. 

 Semi-proportional systems 
This type of system is that which inherently translate votes cast into seats won 
in a way that falls somewhere between the proportionality of proportional 
representation systems and the majoritarianism of plurality-majority systems. 
 
 The most popularly known voting system is the plurality-majority type. In plurality-based 
system, there are typically a small number of candidates to be chosen, and the candidate 
receiving most (not necessarily a majority) votes wins. An alternative to this system requires 
that a candidate need to obtain majority of votes to win. Majority is defined as more than half 
of the number of the voters or ((½ n) + 1), where n denotes the number of voters. This is often 
regarded as a fairer system, since the result reflects the will of the majority of voters. 
One majority type voting strategy is preferential voting. Each voter is required to provide 
an order of preference for the candidates. If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate 
with the lowest first preference vote is eliminated. Votes of the eliminated candidate are 
redistributed to the remaining candidate according to the second preference. Repeatedly, more 
candidates are eliminated until one reaches a majority. Election in the Australian House of 
Representatives is an example of such a system.  
2.3.  Security Threats 
Security is an integral part of voting as there are considerable motives to cheat in voting and 
the result of voting affects many people. There are numerous security threats to a voting 
system including vote buying/selling, coercion/intimidation, unauthorised voting, double 
voting, corrupt authorities, and rigging. We provide classification of the threats based on the 
attacker, and some examples of the threats as follows: 
Developers/vendors 
Moving into e-voting, there are other problems highlighted by Mercuri (2000), Harris (2003), 
and Jefferson, et al. (2004). The requirement of having a voter verifiable paper audit trail was 
first studied by Mercuri (2000) since she does not trust the softwares used for voting. This is 
because developers/vendors may be corrupt. Specific examples of alleged cheating in e-voting 
are provided by Harris (2003). She states that vote tampering is made easier using e-voting as 
the process can now be automated. The work was then published academicly by Kohno, et al. 
(2004). Following from the work by Mercuri (2000), Harris (2003) argues that without proper 
vote audit trail, it is even easier to tamper with the voting result. In this category, secure 
programming principles, and independent testing and certification authorities are required to 
prevent cheating by the developers/vendors. 
Authorities 
Although physical security measures are in place, the conduct of voting still requires voting 
authorities. These officials range from security guards, registration authorities, election judges 
in polling sites to tally authorities. A security threat in this category is corruption of an 
authority. A corrupt authority can basically tamper with the voting result, where the difficulty 
level to tamper with the result depends on the trust level of the authority. An authority given a 
high level of trust can more easily manipulate the voting result compared to an authority 
given a low level of trust. To prevent corrupt authorities, they are chosen based on their 
reputation, and a set of regulation (codes of conduct, procedures, fines, and punishments) and 
auditing are enforced to deter the officials from being corrupt. More than one authority with 
the same role can also be chosen, such that it is not possible for one authority to corrupt the 
voting result. 
Voters 
Acknowledged by Jones (2001), voting has not always been private. Prior to the use of 
official ballots, coercion/intimidation and corruption were common among voters. Thus, 
voting results did not reflect true opinion of the voters. To eliminate this problem, private 
voting was enforced with voting conducted privately using paper ballots inside a polling 
booth. However, this led to vote buying/selling where buyers hand out filled-in ballots outside 
 polling booths for the voters to cast into the ballot-box. Voters then produce an empty ballot 
to the buyer afterward.  
The use of official ballot printed and distributed by the government was then enforced to 
alleviate this problem. It later became known as the Australian ballot or secret-ballot, since it 
was first used in the states of Victoria and South Australia in 1856 (Australian Electoral 
Commission 2000) to enforce compulsory secrecy in voting. 
External 
An external attacker might disrupt or manipulate voting for either personal, financial, or 
political gain (e.g. terrorist organisation). An example of external threat is to physically block 
the polling sites such that voters are unable to vote during the voting period, or 
coerce/intimidate voters not to vote or to vote according to the attacker’s choice (not the 
voter’s choice). Other possible attacks in this category include hackers compromising voting 
machines, tally machines, or performing a denial of service attack, such that the votes are 
unable to be transported for counting. Some of these attacks are listed by Jefferson, et al. 
(2004). Some precautions to prevent such threats include placing security guards in polling 
places and only using secure private networks for voting. 
The work by Jefferson, et al. (2004) analysed the security of an experimental Internet 
voting system to be used by the US citizens to vote from overseas. The report highlights the 
importance of security for voting, and the infeasibility of ensuring security on Internet-based 
voting. The Internet consists of numerous different networks belonging to different 
administrative domains, and thus it is infeasible to strictly control the security of data 
travelling through the public Internet. It is also impractical to enforce physical security and 
ensure the security of each personal computers used by the voters. Thus, we only recommend 
the use of polling-booth voting. 
Equipment failures (glitches) 
Threats in this category include equipment failures, glitches, or malfunction. This might occur 
accidentally, or by sabotage. By thorough inspection prior to the voting period and the use of 
sealed or tamper-resistant devices and backup procedures, these types of threats can be 
minimised/eliminated. 
Threats can also originate from a combination of attackers. External entities can corrupt the 
authorities, developers/vendors, or voters, and a voter may accidentally break a voting 
machine. As voting result affects many people, the risk is too high for a voting system to be 
compromised. Compared to current online commercial transactions, a different and higher 
security level is required for an e-voting system. 
2.4.  Security Requirements 
Addressing the threats in the previous subsection, a number of security requirements need to 
be formulated. Comprehensive and often complex security requirements are fundamental to 
ensure secure voting. These security requirements are as follows: 

 Accuracy: as a basic property of voting, the voting result must reflect correct 
tabulation of the individual ballots. 

 Privacy: voter-vote relationship must be kept private to ensure that voters 
express their true opinions without fear of being intimidated. 

 Receipt-freeness: introduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra 1994, voters must 
neither be able to obtain nor construct a receipt which can prove the content of 
their vote to a third party. This is to prevent vote buying/selling, such that 
voters are not used as a proxy to cast votes. 

 Eligibility: only authorised voters are allowed to vote, preventing fraudulent 
votes from being counted in the tally stage. 
 
 Prevention of double voting: this ensures that all voters are allowed to vote 
only once, such that each voter has equal influence in the voting result. 

 Fairness: no partial tally is revealed before the end of the voting period to 
enforce privacy and ensure that all candidates are given a fair chance. 

 Robustness: the system must be able to tolerate certain faulty conditions and 
manage some disruptions. 

 Verifiability/accountability: correct voting process must be verifiable to 
prevent incorrect voting result. A stronger notion is universal verifiability, 
where everyone (including observers and outside parties, and not just those 
taking part in voting) can verify that voting was conducted correctly, and that 
the result is not corrupted.  
 
A secure e-voting implementation must address all the security requirements. This is difficult 
and complex to implement. The US Federal Election Commission (2002) issued a final 
Voting System Standard in 2002. However, although it specifies definitive requirements, the 
standard lacks in build and implementation specifics. Another work in voting standard is 
currently performed by IEEE with project number 1583 titled “Voting Equipment 
Standards”
1
, and project number 1622 titled “Standard for Voting Equipment Electronic Data 
Interchange”
2
. However, they are still work in progress.  
To have a secure working e-voting system, security must be incorporated from start to 
finish: from its design phase, throughout its development phase and final deployment phase. 
We discuss these phases in more detail in the next three sections. 
3.  CRYPTOGRAPHIC DESIGN OF E-VOTING SYSTEMS 
To build a secure system, its foundation must also be secure. In comparison to paper-based 
voting, e-voting provides better security as it allows the use of cryptographic protocols. This 
is important as security of the system can be analysed formally, and verifiability can also be 
provided.  
Privacy is one of the most important security requirements in voting. Each vote must be 
private to its corresponding voter. This is to prevent vote buying/selling or intimidation such 
that the voting result reflects the true opinion of the voters, and not a corrupted one. 
In manual/traditional voting, a voter typically records his/her vote in a ballot inside a 
private and physically secure location (e.g. polling booth). Afterwards, the ballot is kept 
secret and anonymised by a ballot-box. Finally, the anonymised ballots are tabulated to reveal 
the voting result. 
In cryptographic voting schemes, ballots are modelled as a tuple of (ID, Vote) containing 
the identity of the voter ID and its corresponding vote Vote. The ID-Vote relationships must 
be kept private according to the privacy requirement. This is possible by either preserving the 
confidentiality of the vote as (ID, Conf(Vote)) or by preserving the confidentiality of the 
voter’s identity as (Conf(ID), Vote), where Conf is a function providing confidentiality 
service. These are two categories that can be used to realise a cryptographic voting protocol. 
The first is by exploiting the homomorphism property of the underlying cryptosystem, and the 
second is by simulating a ballot-box using mix-network (mixnet). 
3.1.  Homomorphic Encryption-based Voting Schemes 
In schemes using the (ID, Conf(Vote)) approach, protection is offered against the voting 
strategy of a particular voter. An encryption function E is used to encrypt the vote, such that 
the integrity and confidentiality of the vote are preserved.  
                                                          
1
 The URL for the group is http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/scc38/1622/, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
2
 The URL for the group is http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/scc38/1583/, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
 For n voters, and i = 1, 2, …, n, voter Vi forms his/her ballot ci by encrypting his/her vote vi 
using a homomorphic encryption function E as ci = E(vi). Ballot ci is then submitted to the 
tally authorities. After the voting period has ended, tally authorities reveal the voting result 
from decrypting the combination of n ballots, where individual ballot ci is not decrypted. 
Tabulation of ballots is possible by exploiting the homomorphism property of the encryption 
function. For example: 
 
 E(v1) × E(v2) × … × E(vi) × ... × E(vn) = E(v1 +  v2 +  … + vi + … + vn) (1) 
 
ElGamal (1986) and Paillier (1999) proposed two examples of homomorphic 
cryptosystem. The homomorphism is inherited from the use of exponentiation in the 
encryption process. Voting schemes in the literature using this approach include Benaloh and 
Tuinstra (1994), Benaloh (1996), Cramer, et al. (1996), Cramer, et al. (1997), Baudron, et al. 
(2001), and Lee and Kim (2002). 
Using this approach, the universal verifiability property is also satisfied, since the ballots 
are published, and everyone can check whether there are any ballots excluded from the 
tabulation. 
3.2.  Mixnet-based Voting Schemes 
In schemes using the (Conf(ID), Vote) approach, anonymity service is offered to the voter 
by simulating a ballot-box cryptographically as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mixnet-based Voting Scheme 
 
There are m mix servers (mixers) working sequentially in the mixnet, randomly permuting 
the ordering of the ballots. For m mixers, n voters, i = 1, 2, …, n, and j = 1, 2, …, m, each 
voters Vi submits their ballots ci = E(vi) to the first mixer S1. The first mixer S1 then processes
3
 
the ballots ci, and output the ballots in a random order as cϕ (i),1. Afterwards, cϕ (i),1 are 
forwarded as inputs to the second mixer S2, repeatedly until the final output cϕ (i),m are 
obtained. The function ϕ (i) denotes a random permutation function from i = 1, 2, …, n, to i = 
1, 2, …, n. The final outputs of the last mixer Sm are then decrypted using a decryption 
function D as vi = D(ci). If at least one mixer keeps the random permutation secret, then the 
anonymity of the votes output by the mixnet can be guaranteed. This is a straight-forward 
design solution to satisfy the privacy requirement.  
                                                          
3
 Normally, the process include re-encryption of the ballots. Another mode of operation is by using decryption 
chain. However, decryption chain mixnet lacks robustness when one of the mixer fails (Golle, et al. 2002). 
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 The mixnet can also be viewed as a confidentiality translation service from (ID, 
Conf(Vote)) to (Conf(ID), Vote). Pioneered by Chaum (1981), schemes using this approach 
include Sako and Kilian (1995), Okamoto (1997), Jakobsson, et al. (2002), Golle, et al. 
(2002), Lee, et al. (2003), Chaum (2004), and Aditya, et al. (2004). Tabulation is straight-
forward as in the traditional/manual voting using votes output by the mixnet.  
3.3.  Cryptographic Primitives 
ElGamal (1985) and Paillier (1999) are the two commonly used cryptosystems to construct an 
e-voting protocol. Aside from the homomorphism property, they are public-key based 
cryptosystems and allow ciphertext re-encryption.  
Eligibility can be satisfied as digital signatures can be implemented using a public-key 
based cryptosystem. Digital signature is formed by encrypting the hash of a message using the 
private key of a user. The signature can be publicly verified as it is decrypted using the public 
key of the user and compared to the original hash of the message claimed by the user. Double 
voting is also prevented by using digital signatures, as each ballot can be publicly checked 
whether it belongs to one voter. 
Receipt-freeness can be realised as the ciphertext can be re-encrypted to a different 
ciphertext and still decrypt to the same plaintext. This is possible as the cryptosystem uses 
randomisation in the encryption process, such that one plaintext can be encrypted to more 
than one ciphertexts. The re-encryption process simply “updates” the random value used in 
the ciphertexts. Since the user does not hold the knowledge of the random value in the 
ciphertext, he/she cannot prove the content of the ciphertext to be as what he/she claims. Note 
that an untappable channel is required in some schemes to realise receipt-freeness, for a voter 
to submit the ballot to be randomised by an authority before the ballot is made public. An 
untappable channel is a physical assumption used in the design, and can be realised in the 
implementation using a physically secure private communication channel. 
Other cryptographic primitives are required to satisfy all the security requirements, and 
complete the protocols based on Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. As there are many primitives 
that can be incorporated in a scheme, we only discuss two primitives we consider being 
important: 

 Threshold decryption: the power of decryption is normally shared amongst m 
number of tally (decryption) authorities using a t-out-of-m threshold scheme 
(Shamir 1979), such that at least t number of the decryption authorities are 
required to successfully decrypt the ballots in mixnet-based voting schemes, or 
to decrypt the combination of ballots (and not to decrypt the individual ballots) 
in homomorphic encryption based voting schemes. This primitive allows trust 
to be distributed between a number of authorities. Using this primitive, privacy 
is preserved, and fairness and robustness are satisfied. 

 Zero-knowledge protocol: this protocol allows a prover to convince a verifier 
that the prover holds a secret without revealing the secret itself. An example 
protocol by Chaum and Pedersen (1992) allows a prover to prove his/her 
knowledge of a plaintext inside a ciphertext without revealing the plaintext to 
the verifier. Authorities can be sure that the ballots are formed properly in 
homomorphic encryption based voting schemes, and voters can be sure that the 
shuffled ballots are not modified in the mixnet in mixnet-based voting 
schemes. Using this primitive, accuracy and verifiability are satisfied. 
3.4.  Comparison 
Different types of cryptographic voting schemes are suited to different types of counting 
systems. Aditya, et al. (2003) shows that it is impractical to realise preferential voting systems 
 using homomorphic encryption based schemes. Voters are required to perform more 
computationally expensive tasks in homomorphic encryption based schemes, as they are 
required to prove that the ballots were formed properly. Also, the bandwidth requirement is 
higher since voters are required to communicate the ballot and the proof. Thus, homomorphic 
encryption based schemes are not scalable in terms of the voting strategy used. Only simple 
structured vote (yes/no voting, and 1-out-of-m voting) can be accommodated using this type 
of scheme; while write-in ballots can not be realised. On the other hand, it is an elegant 
approach to provide privacy to voter-vote relationship. Ballot tabulation is more efficient 
since the voting result is obtained automatically by combining the individual ballots. Receipt-
freeness and public verifiability is also straight-forward as individual ballots are kept secret 
but made public. 
The concept of mixnet-based voting scheme is easier to understand as it mimics the use of 
ballot-box in traditional/manual voting. Ballot submissions incur less computational cost for 
voters as they are not required to prove the validity of the ballots. Bandwidth requirement is 
also less than what is required for homomorphic encryption based schemes as voters only 
need to communicate the ballot to the mixnet. This type of voting scheme can accommodate 
flexible vote structure, even write-in ballots. However, ballot validity checking and tabulation 
are still performed manually. Mixers bear computational cost for proving that their shuffling 
was correct. Also, voters typically require untappable channel to communicate the ballot to 
the mixnet for receipt-freeness. Public verifiability is more complicated as ballot shuffling 
need to be verified. 
Recent research by Kiayias and Yung (2004) combined the approach of homomorphic 
encryption and mixnet by using a flag on the ballot. Ballots containing a particular vote are 
flagged to be processed using the homomorphic approach, and write-in ballots are processed 
using the mixnet approach. This seems to be the most promising direction since it tries to 
overcome the disadvantages, but also combines the advantages of both approaches. 
3.5. Security vs. Performance 
Batch verification (Bellare, et al. 1998, Boyd and Pavlovski 2000, Aditya, et al. 2004) is a 
useful cryptographic primitive to check a group of proof instances based on discrete 
logarithms simultaneously. It exploits the homomorphism property in the underlying proof 
system used. As exponentiation is a computationally expensive task in computing, the 
efficiency improvement is possible by combining the exponents first, and performs one 
exponentiation on the combination of the exponents afterward (more detail is available from 
Bellare, et al. 1998, Boyd and Pavlovski 2000, Aditya, et al. 2004). Thus, a performance gain 
can be achieved since only one exponentiation is performed using the batch verification 
technique instead of multiple exponentiations on each of the proof instances.  
However, security is generally proportional to computational cost in cryptographic 
processes. Not everything in the cryptographic voting schemes can be batched. Higher 
computational cost requires longer computational time to complete. On the other hand, 
performance can be sacrificed to achieve better security (and vice versa) according to the 
voting application.  
Better performance can be obtained by lowering the complexity of the scheme, which 
translates to reduced level of security. In national election, all the security requirements must 
be satisfied, while performance is more important in reality television shows. Security is a 
trade-off to performance. 
4.  DEVELOPING AN E-VOTING SYSTEM 
There are currently problems with e-voting and trust issues in e-voting vendors in the US. E-
voting vendors in the US are allowed to be private companies, where the certification 
 authority has some connections to the vendors (as documented by Harris, 2003). This raises 
concern as the manufacturer of the machines may be biased to a particular candidate.  
On the other hand, e-voting in India was conducted successfully with very minor problems 
compared to the US one. Development of e-voting in India was performed partially by the 
government. The difference between the two is fundamentally a trust issue. Note that this 
issue also exists in the paper-based voting system. 
Building a sound and secure e-voting implementation requires a sound and secure design. 
The design of an e-voting system must use cryptographic protocol as in Section 3. The 
cryptographic scheme chosen for a real system must be built properly by consulting with the 
designer. Proper development, testing and certification, are keys to public confident for a 
secure system. 
4.1.  Trust Issues 
Building a system as per the design specification is not often straight-forward. As the security 
requirements are complex, the cryptographic protocol design is also complex. The complexity 
is then transferred to the development phase, and the complication made it difficult to 
perfectly implement a system according to its design. Furthermore, there are trust issues to 
voting developers/vendors as shown by Mercuri (2000) and Harris (2003). Incompetent 
programmer can introduce software bugs in their program, or even create a faulty one. 
Corrupt developer/vendor can deliberately place a backdoor to voting software to later 
manipulate voting result.  
An obvious solution is to use a trusted developer/vendor to build a secure voting system 
according to the secure design. However, even a good programmer can accidentally introduce 
software bugs in the program. Also, it is weak to measure security of a system by the 
trustworthiness of the developer/vendor. A better method to ensure the security of a system is 
by following best practice in the development process. 
4.2.  Development Process 
Security engineering principles and coding standards (e.g. GNU Coding Standards
4
) must be 
followed in developing the system to minimise the number of software bugs and to ease 
system inspection. Also, the developer must consult regularly with the system designer to 
check whether their program is developed and used appropriately according to the design. 
Independent and impartial testing and certification must be performed to the system. Open 
source is one method to achieve this. An experimental Australian e-voting system has 
received praise from the community since their code is made public by the use of open 
source. Although it has only been used for a trial election, the code for EVACS by Software 
Improvements
5
 is available for public scrutiny. Thus, it has a higher confidence level than a 
closed-source e-voting system. Others following the approach of open source to develop a 
voting system include open voting consortium
6
, and open vote foundation
7
. 
It is difficult to certify that the implementation is compliant with the requirements while 
also making sure that all the mechanisms implemented work properly together. A thorough 
check is required to verify that all the mechanisms and all of their possible interactions in an 
e-voting systems are working as specified. Thorough inspection on the machine code must be 
performed to ensure that the voting system is working as specified, and that there are no 
malicious codes, backdoor, or visible software bugs in the program. One method is to certify 
the system using an international evaluation standard such as common criteria
8
. 
                                                          
4
 The standard is available from http://www.gnu.org/prep/standards_toc.html, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
5
 Their official website is http://www.softimp.com.au/evacs.html, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
6
 Their official website is http://www.openvotingconsortium.org, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
7
 Their official website is http://www.open-vote.org, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
8
 The URL for the project is http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
 Machines used for voting must also be checked to be secure. A trusted computing 
platform
9
 can be used as the hardware inside the machine use encryption to communicate to 
each other, such that the authenticity, confidentiality and integrity of the communication can 
be ensured. Furthermore, trusted systems can be set such that only signed applications that 
have been comprehensively inspected to be secure by an independent and impartial testing 
and certification authority are allowed to be installed and executed in the trusted computing 
platform. Such systems can prevent malicious unchecked or unauthorised codes to be run in 
the machine.  
5.  E-VOTING SYSTEMS DEPLOYMENT 
Although the system has a sound design and was built, tested and certified properly, improper 
use of the system might compromise its security. Thus, the deployment of an e-voting system 
in the real world must follow a set of procedures to maintain its security. Note that this 
problem also exists in the manual/traditional system. 
5.1.  Physical Security 
To maintain the integrity of the system, machines built for e-voting must also be tested and 
certified thoroughly. Fragile seals can be used to easily indicate tampering. Tamper-resistant 
or tamper-evident devices can also be used to ensure security of the system. Physical security 
measures must also be taken, such as storing the machines in a secure location prior to the 
voting period, employing security personnel to guard the location, and implementing access 
control measures (physical locks, username/password, token based systems, biometric) to 
control access to the machines and the system. This is to prevent the machine from being 
faulty due to accident (high temperature environment, flooding, etc) or by malicious 
tampering. 
Audit trails, and auditing must be implemented to account for abnormal situations should 
they occur, to identify the source of a fault, or to identify and trace back an attacker. Backup 
measures must also be implemented to ensure robustness in the event that something wrong 
should happen. Such measures include providing redundant machines as backup machines, or 
to revert back to manual paper-ballot in the extreme case. 
5.2.  Other Issues 
Other issues in using an e-voting system in the real world include political issues, public 
acceptance, and user awareness. An example of political issue is where a conservative party 
opposes the use of an e-voting system because of cost factor. The initial cost of purchase, roll-
out and preparing authorities to use the system nation-wide might be high. However, it is 
inevitable to use e-voting in the future with the scalability limitation of current paper-based 
voting system. Also, e-voting should offer lower operational cost in the long run. 
 While younger voters might prefer the use of e-voting as using new technology, some 
mature age voters might prefer the use of manual/traditional voting system as familiarity 
reasons. Public education must also be provided, such that the technology is understood and 
accepted by the voters. Phased upgrade can be implemented as both manual/traditional and e-
voting systems are used together for a period of time before completely changing to e-voting 
system entirely. 
Better e-voting standard containing requirements and implementations specifics need to be 
developed. Policies, procedures, and legislation are also required to enforce secure e-voting.  
                                                          
9
 The URL for the group is http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org, last accessed 7 October 2004. 
 6.  CONCLUSION 
Implementing a sound and secure e-voting system is not as straight-forward as simply 
employing a counting software. Accuracy, privacy, receipt-freeness, eligibility, prevention of 
double voting, fairness, robustness and verifiability/accountability are security requirements 
that an e-voting system must address. 
Issues in three phases of design, development, and deployment of secure e-voting systems 
have been discussed. To satisfy the security requirements, a voting system must be designed 
(Section 3), developed (Section 4) and deployed (Section 5) properly. A sound and secure 
design using cryptographic protocols is required for a sound and secure system. The system 
must be built according to the design, following development best practices, and thoroughly 
tested and certified. This is to obtain public confidence that the system built is not corrupted. 
Furthermore, proper procedures and security measures are required to maintain the security of 
such system during its deployment. Our future work will focus on examining the security of a 
specific e-voting implementation. 
The move to electronic voting is inevitable. The technology for e-voting already exists, and 
voting machines have been used in some part of the world. It is just a matter of public 
acceptance and time for total deployment of e-voting systems. 
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